Abstract
Introduction
Many secure group communication systems only allow authorized members to send messages to the group. Therefore, a member must check the identity as well as the message source before accepting a received message. The source authentication process is trivial in a peer-to-peer communication system: the two communication parties can agree on one pair key and use it to authenticate each other. In a group system, the group key is shared by all members, which makes it challenging to identify the message source and determine its authorization. Furthermore, If the authorizations can be changed at run-time, the source authentication problem will be even harder.
Two most challenging questions are raised here:
1. How to generate unforgeable validity proofs? Because the group key is shared by all group members, symmetric encryption methods cannot generate unforgeable validity proofs. As an alternative, the digital signature technique could guarantee the source authenticity. However, its computational overhead is prohibitively high. How to generate unforgeable validity proofs is therefore quite challenging.
How to support dynamic authorization change
It is desirable to allow dynamic authorization change. For example, a member's sending right can be revoked at run-time. However, the receiver can authenticate the message correctly only if they have the updated authorization. In a large system, it is dif£cult and expensive to distribute the policy changes to all group members in a reliable and secure way.
Existing Solution
Several reasonable solutions have been proposed to support single source authentication in group systems.
Canetti et al. proposed a k-MAC authentication scheme [1] which let the sender use k MAC keys to compuate k MACs for each message. Each receiver hold a subset of the k MAC keys to verify the received messages. One major problem of this scheme is its computation and communication overhead since the sender needs to compute and send multiple MACs.
Gennaro and Rohatgi proposed a MAC Chain technique [2] to embed the MAC of a packet into its previous packet. If the initial packet is authenticated, the subsequent packets can be veri£ed at low cost. Its main shortcomings are its weak robustness to packet loss and lack of dynamic authorization change support. Figure 2 . Infrastructure of TTA mechanism as well as dynamic authorization change. In addition, we will show that the computation and communication overhead of TTA is low.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3 gives the sketch of the TTA scheme, Section 4 describes one critical technique used in TTA. The performance analysis is put in Section 5. Finally, we reach the conclusion at Section 6.
Transitive Trust Authentication Scheme

Transitive Trust Relation
The basic idea of TTA is is illustrated in Figure 1 : suppose a member A wants to send a message to C, but C accepts this message only if it believes that A is a valid sender. However, C might have no idea of A's authorization. To help C authentication A, a mutually trusted member B can be sets up to authenticate A and certify the validity of A to C. Because C trusts B, it then trust A. This kind of trust relatioin is called textittransitive trust relation. The trust transition process is illustrated in Figure 1 .
TTA extends the basic idea and organizes a multicast system as shown in Figure 2 , four roles exist in the TTA organized system.
Group Leader:
A many-to-many multicast group has one group leader, the group leader takes care of group administrative operations such as group re-keying, group policy changing, etc.; 2. Subgroup Leader: As Figure 2 shows, the group is divided into multiple subgroups. Each subgroup has one subgroup leader. The subgroup leaders trust one another. They authenticate and notarize the group messages sent in/out their subgroups. One shared key K SL
Figure 3. Source Authentication Procedure in Many-to-Many Scenarios
is used by all subgroup leaders to certify the validity of messages to other subgroup leaders. Note that the subgroup leaders are not regarded as group members, they do not have the group key K G , therefore, they cannot access the message content.
3. Group Member: Group members include senders and receivers. Each group member must be a receiver, but only members who are authorized to send messages are senders. Each group member belongs to one and only one subgroup, it only accept messages notarized by it own subgroup leader. Each sender S share one paired key K S,SL with its subgroup leader SL S .
The TTA system has the following trust relations:
• All group components, including senders, receivers and subgroup leaders, trust the group leader.
• The subgroup leaders trust one another.
• All group members trust their own subgroup leaders. Figure 3 illustrates how TTA supports source authentication in many-to-many scenarios:
Sketch of TTA scheme
1.
Step 1: The sender S −→ other group members:
The sender S sends the message content packet to all group members. This packet includes: user ID UID(S), sequence number SN O S , group key version number V KG and the encrypted message content {M } KG .
Upon receiving this packet, the receivers buffer this message and wait for the corresponding message certi£cate. To avoid unlimited waiting, a timer will be set for each buffered message, the valid message certi£-cate must arrive before the timer expires, or else the buffered message will be dropped.
2.
Step 2: The sender S −→ its subgroup leader SL S :
S £rst generates the Message Certi£cate C of this message. The message certi£cate uniquely maps to the corresponding message. If the source of a message certi£cate is valid, the source of the corresponding group message must be valid. Receivers then use the hashed value H M to verify the integrity of message content. After generating the message certi£cate, it uses the paired key K S,SL to generate HM AC KS,SL (C) which can be used by its subgroup leader to identify S.
The message certi£cate as well as its HMAC is sent to S's subgroup leader SL S . SL S authenticates the validity of S through two steps: £rst, SL S checks S's authorization record to see whether it has appropriate sending right. second, SL S identify the sender S by checking the attached HMAC value. Through these two checks, SL S not only identi£es the data source, but also enforces dynamic authorization control.
3.
Step 3: The subgroup leader SL S −→ other subgroup leaders SL G :
If the message certi£cate is veri£ed to be valid, the subgroup leader SL S will certify the validity of the message certi£cate to all other subgroup leaders. SL S replace the HMAC value HM AC KS,SL (C) with a new HMAC HM AC KSL (C), which is computed with the K SL that is known by all subgroup leaders only.
The certi£cate as well as the new HMAC will be distributed to all other subgroup leaders. Other subgroup leaders can check the HMAC to see whether the certi£cate is notarized by a subgroup leader. Because all subgroup leaders trust one another, if HMAC is veri£ed to be generated by one subgroup leader, the corresponding message certi£cate will be regarded as valid by all other subgroup leaders. 
If the certi£cate is veri£ed to valid, other subgroup leaders will certify the validity of the message certi£-cate to their children. Upon receiving the notarized certi£cate, the receivers £rst check whether this notarized certi£cate came from their subgroup leaders. How can receivers authenticate whether the certi£cate originated from their subgroup leader is actually a oneto-many source authentication problem and will be discussed in next section.
If the notarized message certi£cate is veri£ed to be from its subgroup leader, receivers will be con£dent that the source of the certi£cate is valid. The source of the corresponding message will then be regarded as valid. The receivers can then use the hash value H M , which is included in the message certi£cate, to verify the integrity of message content. That £nalizes the whole message veri£cation procedure.
Source Authentication between Receivers and their Subgroup Leader
TTA uses TESLA [3, 4, 5] protocol to achieve source authentication between Receivers and their subgroup leader. It requires that each receiver synchronize with its subgroup leader. After the synchronization, the receivers can use their local time infer the upper bound of the subgroup leader's local time. Figure 4 shows, at the subgroup leader's bootstrap stage, the subgroup leader uses the self authenticated one-way key chain to generate a one-way key chain: the subgroup leader randomly pick a number N and repeatedly applying a one-way hash function H for − 1 times. It then gets a hash value chain: .(H(N ) . The self-authenticated key chain is generated by putting the one-way hashed chain in reverse order. If we use K i to represent the i th key on the key chain, 
Bootstrap Stage As illustrated in
H 0 (N ), H 1 (N ), ...H −1 (N ) ., where H i (N ) = H(H..
I1,I5,I7,I8 are indexes of intervals
Key Disclosure Delay =d intervals Figure 5 . Source Authentication between a receiver and its subgroup leader
If K i is veri£ed to be valid, the validity of the key K l can be veri£ed by check whether
Therefore, the cost of key authentication is very low.
The subgroup leader's side As Figure 5 shows, the subgroup leader SL splits time into even intervals, each interval is T int long. Interval 0 starts at time T 0 , interval i starts at T i = T 0 + i * T int . At any time point, the subgroup leader should be in one interval i. Next,the subgroup leader has a self-authenticated one-way key chain K 
The receiver takes the following steps to check the notarized certi£cate arrived safely:
1. Infer the time interval i the subgroup leader was in when it sent out the notarized certi£cate. Since i is included in the packet, the receiver can verify the i by checking the authenticity of the disclosed key
2. Compute the upper bound of the sender's current time interval x. Because the receiver is loosely time synchronized with the sender, the receiver can compute the upper bound on the sender's clock t s = t r + ∆, and consequently calculate the maximal interval with x = (t s − T 0 )/T int .
3. Compare i + d and x, it x < i + d, this key used to notarize this message certi£cate must be still a secret and the notarized certi£cate arrived safely. Otherwise, probably the key have been disclosed, and the certi£-cate notarization could be forged with the revealed key.
If the notarized certi£cate is assured to arrive safely, the receivers will buffer it and wait for disclosure of the key K 
(C).
If it is valid, the source of the message certi£cate is valid, and the source of the corresponding message is also valid. We follow TELSA's suggestion to set d as RT T /T int +1, here, RT T is a reasonable upper bound on the round trip time between the receiver and the subgroup leader. 
Computation Overhead
We also use simuation program to evaluate TTA's computation overhead. The simulation program is written in C++ and runs on a 1.4GHz Pentium IV Linux PC, cryptography library is OpenSSL [6] . The simulation results show that the experimental machine can process 61900 messages per second. If the average length of messages is 1000 bytes, The experimental machine can process the group messages of around 61.9M(Bytes/second).
The generation of key chain is ef£cient too. If the interval length is 0.1 seconds, computing a key chain long enough to notarize certi£cate for one hour only takes the subgroup leader around 0.12(seconds).
Veri£cation Latency and Probability Veri£cation latency is de£ned as follows: when a group member receives a group message, it records this time as the starting point. The time that the message source is veri£ed is recorded as the ending point. The veri£cation latency is the time elapsed between the starting point and ending point. The dominate factor of veri£cation latency is the notarization key disclosure delay. Assuming that the notarized message certi£cates arrive in constant rate. Under such condition, the average key disclosure latency should be equal to
The simulation program is built up on the NS2(Network Simulator 2) [7] platform, the hardware is a 1.4GHz Pentium IV Linux PC. In the simulation environment, 200 members are divided evenly into two subgroups. 20 out of these 200 members are senders. 10 senders for each group. Each member has a 5MB connection with its subgroup leader, and leaders maintain an 1MB connection with each other. The network transmission latency is 3ms.
The simulation result shown in £gure 6 con£rms our theoretic analysis. Moreover, we can that different message sending rates has little effects on average veri£cation latencies. The dominant factor is still the key disclosure delay.
The veri£cation probability is the ratio of the number of messages veri£ed to the number of messages sent. Because the successful veri£cations of TTA scheme rely on the delivery of both the message and its certi£cate, when network is congested, the veri£cation failure rate will be doubled. We increase the message sending rate to saturate the network and expect to see that TTA's veri£cation probability will drop fast when network is congested. Figure 7 con£rmed that the veri£cation probability is very high when network bandwidth is still available. However, when the traf£c saturates the network, the veri£cation probability drops fast. How to make the TTA system more fault tolerable will be our next research topic.
Conclusion
TTA converts the procedure of many-to-many source authentication into two peer-to-peer source authentication procedures and a one-to-many source authentication procedure. With this conversion, TTA can offer source authentication, dynamic security policy enforcement, and minimal overhead.
